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 Rampant corporate failures have placed 
corporate governance in the limelight again 
however not all governance practices help firms in enhancing 
value. This empirical research examines impact of corporate 
governance practices on shareholders’ value represented by 
earning per share of 243 listed firms on Pakistani Bourse. It 
ensued in the conclusion that overall corporate governance tends 
to have significant impact on earnings per share and reveals 
dichotomy of corporate governance practices based on direction 
of their association with share holders’ value and terms them as 
value boosters and value dampers. It has also been found that pro-
entrenchment practices tend to lower earnings per share in the 
listed firms either due to complacency or vested interests while rest 
of the practices help in enhancing value earned on each share thus 
endorsing the theoretical perspectives emanating out of agency 
and shareholder activism theories. This study emphasizes the 
significance of Board Attendance, Board Independence, Non-
duality of CEO-Chairman Role for listed firms’ value. It also 
shows that entrenchment acts like larger boards, directors’ 
ownership, large block holders and disclosure of such ownership 
can adversely impact the firms’ value and thus play a significant 
role in scaring away the potential investors who primarily look at 
earnings per share for buying of stocks of a particular company. 
It entails policy implications that implementation of counter-
entrenchment regulations needs strengthening as the existing seem 
to have cosmetic effect. Identification and implementation of good 
governance practices can be best ensured when propagated in the 
perspective of value enhancement. 
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Introduction 
 
The word Corporate originates from Latin where the word corporatus is the past 
of “corporare” which means to form into a body. Similarly, “corpus” means 
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“body” in Italian literature. Corporate in English means belonging to a corporation 
or a group of persons or a business body as such. It also means united or combined 
into one. Merriam Webster dictionary defines it as bonded into an association and 
given the right and duties of individual. The word “Governance” originated from 
the ancient Greek word essentially a verb “kybernein” or “kybernao” which means 
steering a ship or guiding and maneuvering an inland vehicle. The expression was 
first used by Plato to mention state governance, how men are ruled by the state. In 
modern English it means something related to government and “to govern” and “to 
run an organization, team, group, project or state”. In today’s world governance is 
more comprehensive than mere steering. Therefore, Corporate Governance in 
simple words means to run a business concern usually an incorporated firm.   
The draft report of Cadbury Committee defined it as,  
“The system by which companies run”. 
However, in the final report Secretary of Committee, Nigel Peace improved the 
basic definition and presented it to be as such: 
Corporate Governance is the short hand expression for the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled; the system involves three 
parties, directors, shareholders and auditors -and is determined by the 
way in which they exercise their respective roles within the statutory 
framework of the companies act. 
Corporate governance has become a popular research area within finance and 
economics. This term; corporate governance is multifaceted encompassing board 
of directors, executive compensation, shareholder activism, ownership structure, 
regulation, ownership structure, disclosure, audit and transparency. The definition 
of corporate governance varies with the framework being followed. International 
Finance Corporation states it like this,  
"The relationships among the management, Board of Directors, 
controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders". 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance has defined it differently: 
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the structure through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining 
those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. 
Corporate failures like Enron and WorldCom and regional financial crisis in 
the recent past call for emphasizing corporate governance for efficient 
running of firms. In Pakistan too Mehran Bank, Taj Company and Mazarba 
scandals revealed weak corporate governance. It is understood that corporate 
governance can effect performance of firms and many studies confirm it too. 
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Therefore this study undertakes to investigate impact of corporate governance 
on firms’ value. 
This section is followed by significance of the study, problem statement, 
literature review, hypothesis developed and details of data collection. In the 
end description of variables, model specification & methodology, data 
analysis, conclusion and policy recommendations are narrated. 
 
Objective & Significance of the Study 
 
This empirical study answers the question that whether corporate governance 
impacts earnings per share. The is an attempt to investigate the inter-relationship 
of various governance practices and the firm value in terms of earnings per share. 
Taking into account previous studies, including those conducted in Pakistan, 
it has been observed that Javed and Iqbal (2010) tested the effect of Corporate 
Governance on external financing of firms, with a too small sample of 60 
companies. Azeem et al. (2013) did not test endogeneity and took only 50 
companies, showing mixed results. Halili et al. (2015) compared family and non-
family businesses in Australia. Abu Ghumni et al. (2015) took two variables of 
Corporate Governance: ownership percentage and shareholder identity in Jordan. 
Alam and Shah (2013) suggested that future research could be done using more 
Corporate Governance variables and a larger sample size. Their study abled to 
confirm the relationship of some governance variables with the risk specific to the 
company; however they did not focus on firms ‘value. Most such studies in 
Pakistani context did not test for endogeneity which makes a call for this research. 
Also fewer studies focused on Earning per Share (EPS) which is keenly watched 
by investors and its relationship with governance is not clear. Therefore, this study 
attempts to determine the relationship of corporate governance and shareholders’ 
value in terms of earnings per share by taking a larger sample and more variables 
of Corporate Governance with endogeneity testing of the variables. 
 
Problem Statement  
 
The problem under consideration is whether corporate governance contributes in 
shareholders’ value in the firms and whether better corporate governance can help 
in augmenting earnings per share of the firms listed on stock exchange in Pakistan. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Agency theory looks at two parties having conflicting interest in the same asset. It 
assumes that principle /owner of a business hires an agent and delegates work to 
manager or an agent with the responsibility to make some work related decisions 
and execute the same in order to protect the interest of the principle. However as 
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admitted by Adam Smith, principal and agents are bound to have different interests 
and an agent may not necessarily work towards safeguarding the interest of 
principal and this is where corporate governance comes into play. During the 
decade of 70s, Barry M. Mitnick and Stephen A. Ross did some spade work for 
the formulation of agency theory. However the theory did not get its more 
developed form until, William H. Meckling and Michael C. Jensen came up with 
a broader view of the notion in 1976 by presenting their paper, which was more 
widely accepted than its previous versions. They explored agency costs and its 
sources which were not previously studied. Later in 1983, Fama and Jensen 
researched that agency relationship can be optimized by seggregating ownership 
and control on decisional authority in firms. Idea of corporate governance seems 
to spring out from the same germ seeds of agency theory. Corporate governance 
today is seen as an answer to some of agency problems faced by corporation and 
firms. Jensen & Murphy also studied pay, incentive and penalty structures for 
optimum performance of management. Some codes of corporate governance like 
duality of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, and having Independent Director 
& Non-executive Directors in board of the firm have their roots in agency theory, 
therefore this theory is still referred to when studying components and 
determinants of corporate governance. 
A persistent question that has intrigued empirical researchers is the 
measurement of the performance, more appropriately so in the settings of the 
ownership formation and board composition of company. The content comprising 
a firm’s performance is the heart of concern for management researchers as it 
explains any variation in performance which itself is a popular topic in 
organizational studies (Gentry & Shen, 2010). Organizational performance has 
many dimensions however its financial aspect has been the most researched one 
(Barney, 2002). In order to estimate financial performance the literature mainly 
suggests the use of measurements based on either accounting performance or 
market performance of a company (Hult et al, 2008). Both hold some advantages 
and some disadvantages as well. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) used the accounting 
profit rate. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and also Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) had used market based ration like Tobin's Q for alternatively measuring the 
business performance in governance studies.  
The two categories mentioned above are different in time and power 
measurement. Most of researchers as McConnell and Servaes (1990), Loderer and 
Martin (1997), Cho (1998), Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Holderneb, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) preferred market 
based measure of financial performance. There has been lot of debate evident from 
literature on comparative advantages of market and accounting based measures 
(Richard et al.,2009). The problem with the accounting measures is that its 
computation is according to  accounting standards that do not incorporate the 
market information and growth prospects like market based ratios. Moreover, 
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accounting measures reflect only single aspect of performance (Lubatkin & 
Shrieves, 1986). Similarly, measures based on accounting like return on assets or 
equity and retained earnings rate are inherently more backwards. Another reason 
to prefer market based measure is that accounting based measures are innately 
retrospective while market based measures are prospective in nature. It is well 
known that retrospective is also transient while prospective is enduring when it 
comes to investment analysis and decision making. (Hoskisson et al., 1998). In 
literature there is mixed trend of using accounting based ratios like return on asset, 
return on equity, net profit margin, and market based ratios like Tobin’s Q, price 
earnings ratios and earnings per share. 
Net income in simple words is the ratio which provides an estimate that how 
much a firm earns on each share held by shareholders or rather how much a 
shareholder earns on each common share held. It is employed by investors as an 
indication of financial excellence of the firm. In financial economics literature it 
has been studied for corporate governance effects by researchers. It was assumed 
by many of them that higher value of earning per share leads to better performance 
in companies. The evidences in past literature are mixed when proving the same. 
It has also been observed from literature that very few researches have looked into 
impact of corporate governance on earnings per share especially in Pakistan. 
An earnings per share is the most significant of all financials indicators 
reported to shareholders (Jorgensen et al., 2014). Corporate governance must 
ensure running business well and earning a good return on share holders’ money 
(Magdi & Nadereh, 2002). Board of directors exercise their power and hence 
control the behaviour of managers in increasing a firm‘s value (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). It has been rightly said that quality of accounting ratios can be determined 
from the kind of corporate governance a firm tends to exercise (Sloan, 2001).  
The relationship could be the other way round as well as accounting 
information is fed to the very corporate governance system resultantly firms are 
better controlled (Bushman & Smith, 2001). A high earning per share reported to 
shareholders can ensue in repurchase of stock by companies thereby attempting to 
manage share prices (Lazonick, 2014). When a corporate entity is not being 
governed in the right way, the investors will not invest in the firm and therefore it 
leads to financial distress ultimately reducing share holders’ value (Waseem, Saleh 
& Fares, 2011). Corporate governance is a mechanism or structure available to the 
company and through it performance of the firm may be monitored (Kajola, 2008).  
Corporate Governance components like board‘s composition, size, audit 
committee and attendance impact financial performance (Fauziah, Yusoff & 
Adamu, 2012). The association developed among components of corporate 
governance and financial performance is quite complicated and cannot be justified 
by one single theory of corporate governance (Fauziah, Yusoff & Adamu, 2012). 
Aman and Nguyen (2008) emphasized the inverse characteristic displayed in the 
relationship of corporate governance and corporate performance. They have 
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included the characteristics of supervisory boards, ownership structure, quality of 
information and security for investor interests in the corporate governance for 
Japanese companies. 
 
Board Size 
 
Generally, studies show that size of board can form a positive correlation with 
performance (Kalsie & Shrivastav, 2016). Researches reiterate  that size of the 
board matters as it tends to influence senior managers and information is speedily 
processed to show better firm performance (Zahra, et al., 2000). Board size also 
effects disclosure level decisions. More directors help in symmetry of information 
(Chen & Jaggi, 2000). The importance of larger board is not a new reality, many 
decades older  researches also stress on the advantages of a larger board 
(Birnbaum,1984). In a study on Malaysian Islamic banks’ corporate governance 
explained 31% of variation in earnings per share and a negative relationship was 
found between Shariah Board size and earnings per share in Malaysian Islamic 
Banks (Shittu, Ahmad & Ishak, 2016). 
Number of Board members is directly linked to firms’ value in United States 
of America (Linck et al., 2008).Similar results were obtained in another research 
(Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014).It was endorsed by a study that magnitude of board 
is linked with Malaysian firms’ performance (Johl et al., 2015).Some studies 
however reported that Board size adversely effects Tobin’s Q and market return in 
United Kingdom (Guest, 2009). The extensiveness of board has negative impact 
on earnings per share in Nigerian listed firms.(Adebayo, Olusola & Abiodum, 
2013). Rarely a study reports no association among board size and earnings per 
share (Gherghina, 2015). 
 
Board Composition  
 
A board of directors usually includes all sorts of directors and is made up of 
executive, non-executive and independent ones. Literature survey shows that 
Board composition and independence tends to cast positive influence on earnings 
per share of the listed Nigerian firms (Adebayo, Olusola & Abiodum, 2013). 
 
Executive Directors 
 
Such directors are on payroll of the firm, working on a senior position. They were 
in majority before Cadbury reforms in 1992 however now report term them as 
“rare-breed”. Executive directors bring value to the board and are equally 
contributing to achievement of the firm in the long running. Executive directors 
positively influence (EPS) earnings per share (Ayesha et al., 2015) in Sri Lankan 
firms. Executive directors are supposed to be employee and directors at the same 
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time which adds to their responsibility. Other directors seek inside information 
from them (Boumosleh & Reeb,2005). Being sub-ordinate of CEO makes them 
less influential on board especially when CEO is also the chairman (Daily & 
Dalton,1993). In Malaysia firms having more executive directors on board perform 
better on Stock Exchange (Shakir, 2008). 
 
Non- Executive Directors 
 
Existence of directors who are non-executive does solve agency problem to a 
major extent (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It brings diversity and independence to the 
board. A primary research conducted on Irish SME’s found that non-executive 
directors take part in strengthening board and its performance significantly. The 
questions in the study were responded by respective Chief Financial Officers of 
the firm (Regan et al., 2005). 
 
Independent Directors 
 
The directors who are never on the payroll of the firm and have no fiduciary rights 
are independent directors. They usually are not allowed to hold shares or depend 
on the firm in any respect. The number of independent non-executive directors 
positively impacts earnings per share however casts no effect on Tobin’s Q ratio 
(Meyer & De Wet, 2013).Board ownership has adverse impact on Tobin’s Q  and 
earnings per share ratio. (Meyer & De Wet,  2013). Similarly number of directors 
serving on South African firms have positive impact on earnings per share (Meyer 
& De Wet , 2013).Independent directors tend to cast mixed influence on Earnings 
per share (Alhaji, Baba & Yousoff,2013). Similar results were shared by another 
research work (Abor & Adijasi, 2007). Theorists believe that independent directors 
make effort in improving auditing mechanism which results in better performance 
(Salleh et al.,2005). However tenure of directors can moderate such behavior 
(Conger & Lawler,2009). An adverse association between presence of independent 
directors and firms’ performance has been reported in Turkish listed firms (Aarat, 
Orbay & Yurtoglar,2010) and found no significant nexus exits between the two 
business phenomena. Same results were obtained for Indian firms (Garg, 2007). 
However in United States negative relationship was reported (Epps & Ismail, 
2009) among independence of board and discretionary accruals. Percentage of 
outside directors is reported to have been associated with higher performance of 
firms in Belgium (Dehaene et al., 2001). Affirmative relationship among board 
independence and composition and firms’ performance in Nigeria has also been 
reported (Uadiale, 2010). 
 
Separation of CEO &Chairman Roles 
 
Jensen in 1993 opinionated that duality of role can ensue in minimization of  
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supervision and increase in agency costs thus giving way to possible poor financial 
performance. Empirical studies show mixed results on effects of chairman and 
CEO separation or vice versa duality on financial performance. Some countries 
allow for duality of the role if approval is granted by shareholders in annual 
meeting for example in Vietnam (Phan & Vo ,2013). More than fifteen countries 
‘corporate codes during 2003 recommended that CEO‘s and Chairman’s positions 
should be separately filled and same should not serve for both purposes (Dahya et 
al., 2009) while some researchers report that 84 percent firms practice creating 
separation between role of chairman and CEO (Hedrick & Struggles, 2009). In 
order to implement the recommendations in many countries, firms have adapted 
themselves and ensured duality (Chen et al.,2008). It was revealed in a study that 
CEO-Chairman duality negatively impacts earnings per share in Nigerian listed 
firms (Adebayo, Olusola & Abiodum, 2013). 
 
Board Attendance  
 
It is believed that more frequent board meeting tend to cast a good impact on 
performance in the firm (Dar et al., 2011). While few older researches  report 
adverse relationship among board members’ meeting and performance in financial 
terms (Vafeas,1999). 
A study conducted on Colombo Stock Exchange unearthed a weak relationship 
among board meeting frequency and earnings per share of Sri-Lankan firms 
(Ayesha et al.,2015). Frequently meeting boards are positively effective for 
performance of firm (Johl et al, 2015). Frequency of board meetings when studied 
in Australian context revealed that it can accelerate the firms’ performance (Hoque 
et al, 2013). 
 
Ownership Concentration (Block Holders) 
 
For American firms more than 10% block holders are 17% on average (Gugler, 
and Weigand, 2003). However its impact on firms’ performance is said to vary 
with context. A research on German firms found adverse or no impact of outside 
block holders on performance measures and it effects positively on firms 
‘performance if block holders are owners of family owned companies (Andres, 
2008). Therefore family block holders are more effective than outside block 
holders. Amir Bhide stated in an article in 1994 that  
“Outside Shareholders cannot easily distinguish between a CEO’s luck 
and ability”. 
According to some researches concentration of ownership can trigger agency 
conflicts in the firms owned by family (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Literature shows 
that effects of concentration vary with the ownership too. However, senior 
executive ownership was positively co-related to performance. 
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Inside (Directors) Ownership 
 
Shareholders own shares which are a certain percentage of the total capital held by 
the firm therefore by virtue of their holding they have a financial stake and certain 
rights in the firm. Researches on American and German panel data of firms 
revealed (Gugler & Weigand, 2003) that inside ownership does effect performance 
of firms reflected by return on assets, however ownership is endogenously related 
to performance while large shareholders exogenously impact the performance.  
It is believed that on average inside shareholding is thirteen percent in United 
States of America (Gugler & Weigand, 2003). Inside ownership may include 
family directors’ ownership. Panel data of Taiwanese firms however showed no 
impact of inside ownership on firms’ performance (Sheu & Yang, 2005). However 
if the ownership is held by senior management of the firm, it may impact 
performance positively. Inside ownership is considered to be an auto mechanism 
for corporate governance and internal control. Various studies endorsed the 
entrenchment hypothesis and convergence of interest. That performance increases 
with high levels of inside ownership and also with the low levels of the same 
whereas in between levels of inside ownership, the performance tends to fall thus 
making a U-shape non-linear trend. The same relationship exists between inside 
ownership and board composition (Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2003). The same has 
been observed in Spanish firms (Iturralde, Maseda & Arosa, 2011).Inside 
ownership is two edged sword for one it tends to solve agency problems by 
aligning the interest of shareholder and management. Secondly in more 
concentration it gives rise to new conflict of interests that is between majority 
shareholder and minority shareholder supposedly outside holder (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Michael Jensen stated in a finance journal published in 1993, 
 “Managers leave the exit to others while they continue to invest so that 
they will have a chair when the music stops”. 
Literature survey shows no relationship of directors ownership and growth 
opportunities (proxied by ratio of market to book value) for one time series while 
in other positive relationship among directors’ ownership and market return was 
found. In the same study the directors’ ownership casted negative impact on market 
returns and earnings per share for another time series for the same sample firms 
(Bhagat, Carey & Elson, 2009). 
 
Institutional Investors 
 
A devoted institutional ownership leads to privileged access of firm-specific 
information which inturn lead to better performance (Piotroski & Roulstone, 
2003). Institutional Investors apply pressure to managers to perform on the basis 
of inside information (Gillan & Starks, 1999). Shareholder activism driven by 
institutional investors has gained popularity over time however their effects have 
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been addressed by very few researches until now (Gillan & Starks,  1999). Stock 
performance of high foreign institutional ownership was found better than in lower 
foreign institutional ownership among Taiwanese firms (Huang & Shiu, 2006). A 
simultaneous research in England and France concluded that institutional investors 
effect performance of initial public offerings when controlled for endogeneity 
(Bruton, Filatotchen, Chanhine & Wright, 2010). Some institutional investors do 
not veto the decisions made by firm’s management as they hold business relations 
with the concerned firm already (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders & Tehranian, 2003). 
No single established association exists between institutional shareholder and 
firm’s performance. This varies with each country and industry. Different studies 
have come up with different result. In Jordan the investors weakly monitor firms’ 
performance (Al-Najjar, 2015). 
 
Group Affiliation 
 
A research (Yu, Ees  &  Lensink, 2009) on Chinese firms revealed that Group 
association positively impacts firms’ performance although the firms are state 
owned but China encourages them to form groups for corporatization’s sake which 
is Chinese alternative to privatization. Another research conducted in Pakistan 
(Ghani , Haroon  & Ashraf , 2011) also compared financial performance of both  
affiliated concerns and non affiliated firms in Pakistan and found that ROA of 
group associated firms tends to be higher and firm size of group firms was larger 
too. Their comparative study was based on non-banking firms. The said research 
also compared the relationship before implementation of corporate governance 
laws in Pakistan that is 1998 for 196 firms and after issuance of code of corporate 
governance in 2002 for 160 firms. Researchers took into account return on assets 
and equity and Tobin’s Q as estimates of accounting based financial performance 
while EPS as measure of stock performance. They concluded that group associated 
firm not performs only but exhibit better profitability than non-group firms and 
also implied that group affiliated firms play an indirect role in economic growth in 
the country in support of market failure argument. 
 
Disclosure of Audit Committee 
 
Board of directors exists in order to make sure the protection of interests of 
shareholders as described by agency theory. The theory doubts that unmonitored 
management can safeguard interests of the shareholders who also hold the 
ownership of the firm. Board committees are formed to oversee the management‘s 
performance. In order to divide work among board members according to their 
expertise Board sub committees are formed which comprise of fewer Board 
members and gives special attention to the relevant matters under purview. One 
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such committee is Board Audit Committee, through which Board delegates to 
oversee financial matters of the company to it (DeZoort et al, 2002).  
Carcello et al., (2002) researched audit committee disclosure in NYSE listed 
firms and found that it was more practised in larger, depository firms with more 
independent committees. Existence of audit committee is said to have a positive 
correlation with financial disclosure (Ho & Wong, 2001) which usually result in a 
better performance of stocks (Mitton, 2002). Back in 1992, Forker also discussed 
audit committee as a monitor to decrease agency expense and enhances disclosure 
quality. 
Research work shows that ownership structure, board of directors and its 
committees effect earnings management policies and therefore results in higher 
earnings per share which attracts and retains investors’ interest (Trapp, 
2009).Researchers yielded results which endorsed the idea that presence of audit 
committee enhances the standard and reliability of financial results (Ahmed & 
Henry, 2012). It was revealed in a study that BAC reduces earnings management 
practices and thus effects earnings per share (Trapp, 2009). 
 
Disclosure of Share Ownership  
 
It has come into financial literature many a times that financial crisis of 1997 was 
a prodigy of flawed corporate governance exhibited by the Asian firms which in 
turn shook the investors’ confidence (Tan, 2000) and  (Mitton, 2002). It is also said 
that in developing economies poor transparency caused information dearth and 
asymmetry which became the reason of a sharp fall in firms’ market value (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976).Lower transparency means lower level of governance. In order 
to improve financial performance, disclosure must be given with full details (Lobo 
& Zhou, 2001).Investors like to invest in securities of firms which give out full 
disclosure information (Mitton, 2002). 
 
Age of the Firm 
 
Age affects the performance of the firm therefore older firms tend to have better 
performance as a consequence of survival bias and also due to the effect known as 
learning curve (Chen, 2001). Older firms are more established and well rooted in 
the industry and therefore is able to enjoy economies of scale. Therefore it is 
essential for researchers to control the impact of age in studying the impact of 
corporate governance on financial and market performance (Sheu & Yang, 2005; 
Mayur & Saravanan, 2006). 
 
Market Risk 
 
It is the systematic risk which is innate in market dynamics and as such cannot be 
controlled however diversification is possible to some extent. Studies show that it 
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is related to corporate governance and effects the relationship even when found 
insignificant Saunders et al. (1990) discovered that inside holding can play an 
effective role in mitigating risk. 
 
Development of Hypothesis 
 
Agency theory implies that wealth maximization needs intervention of directors as 
managers themselves would never act in the interest of owners while fiduciary 
capitalist theory believes in shareholders especially institutional investors’ 
activism which may result in increasing value. However entrenched managers and 
directors may not be able to look after wealth addition goal. Agency theory also 
believes in separation of ownership and control functions therefore chairman and 
CEO duality is expected to cast a positive impact on firm value. 
In the light of above literature and theoretical background, we are inclined to 
believe that the following variables of corporate governance would impact firm’s 
value represented by earnings per share when controlled for size and market risk. 
The hypothesis of the study developed is as under; 
H1: Corporate Governance Practices (BDS, BCOMP, CEOS, BAII, F5BLOCK, 
F10BLOCK, DO, II, GA, BAC, SO) are associated with Earning per Share (EPS) 
of PSE-listed firms. 
 
Data Collection  
 
In current research study population includes listed non-financial firms in Pakistan. 
In selection of sample, stratified and judgmental random sampling design used 
were deemed best fitted criterion in this research. The study uses panel data of 243 
PSE-Listed firms from 2009 to 2015. Time period and data breadth used for 243 
chosen firms seem enough to suffice the research question and ensure reliability 
for the study. In order to analyze research objective, secondary data on yearly basis 
has been used. Data on financial value and corporate governance have been 
collected personally from annual reports and financials available from stock 
exchange, corporate offices and their official websites as well as from State Bank 
of Pakistan. Data on corporate governance have been extracted from PSE 
(formerly KSE). The subsets of corporate governance have been derived from 
various documents of SECP and ICAP. Researchers usually collect data from big 
firms which might be doing well because of profound resources and may not be 
essentially due to good governance. Therefore small firms have also been selected 
in the sample and similarly firms which exited the market have not been missed 
either. Enlistment on stock exchange has been taken as basis of sampling. In this 
research study micro data panel have been used which are unbalanced in nature. In 
this data each cross section observations have different time series. Therefore time 
series are more than one that is T≠1. 
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Description and Computation of Variables  
 
Most of variables are in percentages, logs and indices. A few variables have 
dummy values. The Board Composition Index was calculated by taking 
percentages of actual number out of required number of directors in each category 
and summing all up. Similarly Board attendance Index was formed while 
institutional investors, first 5 percent block holders and directors’ ownership were 
computed as percentages. Similarly the indicators of firm value for which earnings 
per share have been taken as proxy were computed through formulas. Some 
variables were computed as dummy due to their mutually exclusive dichotomous 
nature which included group association, presence of first 10% block holders, 
disclosure of board audit committee and disclosure of share ownership. Log of 
firm’s age since inception was also computed. The other control variable was 
computed through formula. 
 
Table 1. Varaibles 
 
Variable 
Abbrevation 
Variable Description 
BDS Board Size 
CEOS CEO &chairman separation 
BCI Index of executive ,non-executive & independent director 
BAI Board Attendance Index 
 F5BLOCK % of Shares held by first five block holders out of total 
shares 
II % of shares held by institutional investors out of total shares 
%F10BLOCK % of Shares held by first ten block holders out of total shares 
BLOCK10 existence of block ten -dummy(0,1) 
DO % of shares held by Directors out of total shares 
GA Group Association -Dummy(0,1) 
BAC Disclosure of Board Audit Committee-Dummy (0,1) 
SO Disclosure of Director Share Ownership -Dummy (0,1) 
EPS Earnings per Share 
AGE Age of the firm -number of years since incorporation(log) 
MRISK Market Risk 
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Net income after subtraction of dividend is the earning available to common 
shareholder which when divided by total number of shares gives earning per share 
while Beta of Regression in MM model is taken as proxy for market risk. 
 
Model Specification & Methodology 
 
The model described in terms of OLS equation is as such, 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 +  𝛼2𝐵𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡   +  𝛼3𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡  +   𝛼4𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +   𝛼5𝐵𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑡
+   𝛼6𝐹5𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐹10𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼8𝐷𝑂𝑖𝑡 +   𝛼9𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑡
+   𝛼10𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡 +   𝛼11𝐵𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 +   𝛼12𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 +   𝛼13𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡
+   𝛼14𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 +  ∈𝑖𝑡 
 
Where dependent variable is earnings per share (EPS) while independent variables 
are components of corporate governance given in the table above with their 
abbreviations and descriptions. The market risk and age of firms are controlling 
variables while ∈𝑖𝑡 is error term in the above equation.  
While reviewing literature on corporate governance especially the data 
analysis, it has been observed that researchers stumbled upon many econometric 
problems. The encountered problems are endogeneity, missing variables, sample 
selectivity bias and error in measurement of variables. However these problems 
are not faced in only estimation rather at every step of research and lead to wrong 
estimation results. If any research study is plagued by these problems then not only 
results of estimation but descriptive and diagnostics also may not turn out to be 
correct (Börsch-Supan & Köke, 2000). In order to resolve above mentioned issues 
diagnostic tests like White test, Pagan and Haussmann test were performed in this 
study and it was found that the most suitable technique is Generalized Method Of 
Moments (GMM) in order to tackle endogeneity occurring at the right hand side 
variables due to unobservable heterogeneity of the firms and also contributed by 
the structural reverse causality (Himmelberg et al., 1999). An example of reverse 
causality is that institutional investors make the firm perform better and therefore 
a firm that performs better can attract more institutional investors, now here the 
causality is reversed.  
The second problem found in literature is regarding missing variable in a 
equation which leads to misspecification of the model. It is expected that some of 
the variables will not have linear relationship (Börsch-Supan & Köke, 2000). 
Theoretically all possible variables have been included like board structure, 
ownership, disclosure, earning per share, market risk and age of the firms. It has 
been assumed that some of the variables included may not be significant but still 
contribute to the overall significance of equation and therefore our model is not 
underspecified.  
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Data Analysis  
 
The pre-estimation diagnostic tests performed in this study included VIF, Breusch 
Pagan test, White test, SK test, pooled OLS, OLS with random effect and  fixed 
effect, FGLS, PCSE, Haussmann tests. A two step system GMM has been run with 
lagged independent variables as GMM instruments in STATA. The descriptive 
analysis was also carried out. The number of observations for Earnings per Share 
(EPS) is 1550. The minimum value of EPS observations collected is -222.82 while 
maximum value is 846.76.These values reflect on range of data which contains 
both negative and positive values. Mean value comes around 11.61208 which is 
central point in distribution. Its standard deviation is 44.19617 which is high 
enough to indicate the abnormality of data Its skewness is 9.08821 which is well 
above 1 and indicate highly positively skewed data and kurtosis is 142.3112 which 
indicates the distribution of EPS is leptokurtic. Therefore descriptive of EPS 
suggested abnormality in data. It was revealed that there was no multicollinearity 
but the problem of endogeneity existed 
 
Results & Discussion 
 
When Generalized Method of Moments was run in STATA for previously 
mentioned equation, following estimates were obtained, which is given in the table 
below. 
Table 2. Results 
Independent  
Variables  
Dependent 
Variable (EPS) 
BDS 
-1.530*** 
(-5.02) 
BCI 
5.014* 
(2.09) 
CEOS 
4.191*** 
(4.33)` 
BAI 
18.90*** 
(3.55) 
F5BLOCK 
0.0953** 
(3.27) 
F10BLOCK 
-39.21*** 
(-10.61) 
DO 
-0.114*** 
(-4.68) 
Abida Razzaq and Ghulam Shabbir Khan Niazi 
222                                                      Global Social Sciences Review (GSSR) 
II 
0.120*** 
(3.35) 
GA 
11.23*** 
(8.12) 
BAC 
4.372*** 
(4.02) 
SO 
-10.74** 
(-2.71) 
AGE 
10.72*** 
(4.99) 
MRISK 
4.855* 
(2.09) 
CONSTANT 
1.341 
(0.21) 
Arellano-Bond testb [0.597] 
Hansen-Sargan testc [0.566] 
Difference in Hansen Test d [0.554] 
Observations 1448 
 
Notes: 
 
a. We report two-step GMM results with corrected standard  errors for a  finite sample. 
The T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote the 5% , 1% and 0.1% 
significance levels respectively. The dependent variable is the EPS. The model is 
estimated using the system-GMM estimator described in Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
lags of all explanatory variables have been used as instruments of the GMM in equation.  
b. The p-value from Arellano-Bond test for the null hypothesis of no AR (2) serial 
correlation of the residuals. 
c. The p-value from the Hansen-Sargan test for the null hypothesis of valid instruments. 
d. Difference in Hansen Test 
The results indicate that large Board Size, First 10 % Block holders and 
Directors’ Ownership negatively impact earning per share at 99.99% confidence 
level. Board composition index and market risk both have positive impact at 95% 
while board attendance index, CEO Chairman separation, First 5 % block holders, 
institutional investors, group association, disclosure of board audit committee and 
age contribute towards higher earnings per share and the same can be claimed at 
99.99% confidence level. Share ownership when disclosed negatively impacts 
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earnings per share. The number of observations were 1448 while Arellano Bond 
test value is 0.597  indicating no autocorrelation and Hansen Sargan test value 
0.566 indicates that there‘s no over identifying restrictions in the model and the 
instruments are valid. Difference in Hansen test value is 0.554 therefore the model 
has been equally identified. Results show that by increasing one unit of Board there 
can be a decrease of 1.530 units in Earning per Share. The largest negative impact 
has been observed for First Ten percent block holders where just one unit increase 
can bring 39.21 units decrease in EPS, keeping rest everything constant. The 
smallest positive impact has been depicted by concentration of ownership by first 
five percent block holders where its one unit increase can bring about a 0.0953unit 
change in shareholders’ value.  The research has identified governance practices 
as either EPS booster or EPS damper. 
 
Table 3. EPS Dampers & Boosters  
EPS Dampers EPS Boosters 
High Directors’ Ownership High Board Composition Index 
First 10% or more Block holders Board Attendance of All Directors 
Disclosure of Directors’ Ownership Separation of CEO from Chairman 
Role 
Large Board Size High Institutional Investors holding 
 Presence of Group Association 
 Presence Board Audit Committee 
 Presence of First 5% Block holders 
Pro entrenchment have negative significant relationship with earnings per share 
and are thus value dampers while non-entrenchment practices positively affect 
rather boost earnings per share as per T-stats and p-values  estimates obtained as a 
result of running generalized method of moments. The coefficients are small as 
reported by most corporate governance studies. It is evident that all corporate 
governance variables are entwined and inter-related which made data analysis 
complicated. Institutional investors are not sometimes efficient as they feel that its 
responsibility of independent directors to monitor performance. In other words, 
board independence makes them less efficient. On the other hand, independent 
directors make audit committee more efficient. Executive directors may not be 
effective due to their subordination to CEO. In case of Chairman and CEO role 
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duality, executive directors are not efficient while otherwise they might tend to 
make entrenchments and may be involved in tunneling.  
 
Figure 1. Impact of CG on Shareholders Value 
From results it is obvious that institutional investors closely monitor performance 
and consists of business corporate rather than venture capitalists and they are also 
long term shareholders who take keen interest in the matters of firm. However this 
shareholder activism has still not reached its full potential where it can be termed 
as fiduciary capitalism. 
Similarly first ten percent block shareholders might be venture capitalists that 
serve their interests or are simply indifferent firms. Large boards are ineffective 
and directionless. Non-duality of CEO & chairman role contributes in enhancing 
firm’s value. Group association makes business opportunities and resources 
available to affiliated firms. Similarly, due to board independence audit 
committees become effective while ownership concentration does affect earnings 
per share but similar to board size the relationship is not linear but moves along an 
inverse U shaped. Very small boards and ownership concentration are not effective 
while a reasonable size does make a dent. Again excessively large size would 
render boards and concentrated ownership useless. One fact that is clear from 
results is that minority shareholders must be given protection. If corporate 
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governance practices are seen as value boosters or dampers for the worse and not 
just as a method of running organizations, the very purpose of having such 
mechanism in place can be met with and all agency problems can be resolved. 
Such categorization may not be difficult to achieve but its generalization would 
certainly be problematic as boosters and dampers might vary with the varying 
context. Here comes the role of researcher to find new theories, which may be able 
to explain these variations. Any categorization made should not be spurious and 
must be grounded in theories of organization and governance in order to benefit in 
a better way from governance practices. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Results indicate board size, first 10 Block holders, director ownership and 
disclosure of ownerships adversely impact the earnings per share. These pro-
entrenchment acts suppress EPS in Pakistani firms. The results are well justified 
according to Entrenchment Theory of Corporate Governance. One other probable 
reason could be firms’ earnings management is either inefficient or aimed at tax 
and dividend evasion rather than market performance. While the study has good 
reasons to understand that CEO Chairman role separation, board attendance index, 
board composition index, institutional investors, First 5 block holders, group 
association, age and market risk cast significant positive effect on earnings per 
share in firms listed on PSE. Hence according to agency theory and stewardship 
theory the agents & stewards strive to enhance shareholders value. 
 
Policy Implications & Recommendations 
 
Research suggests that counter-entrenchment policies may be adopted to increase 
firm’s value and profitability while the following the rest best practices of 
corporate governance may be emphasized in a more rigorous manner aimed at 
enhancing shareholders’ value. This study highlights the negative consequences of 
large block holders on Earning per share which in turn entails protection of 
minority shareholders. Also detailed disclosure of directors ‘ownership may scare 
away the potential investors therefore directors’ ownership may be curtailed. The 
future researches may employ entrenchment policies and study their impact on 
earnings management. 
In Pakistan corporate governance is seen more as a regulatory intervention and 
a compliance obligation rather than a sovereign choice made on the basis of 
consequences it generates. Firms perceive governance practices as a formality to 
be dispensed with. There is high need that these are propagated as value boosters 
and dampers so that the best governance practices can be picked up and adopted 
by firms. New ideas and theories must be propagated so that corporate governance 
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is not seen as an ordinary matter of running a business but a decision choice of 
enhancing share holders’ value. 
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